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To Protect the Right to Vote,
Look to State Courts and State
Constitutions

W

Joshua A. Douglas*

hat is the right to vote? This question has befuddled courts, law
professors, historians, and policymakers for years. We hear that
the right to vote is “fundamental,”1 the “essence of a democratic
2
society,” and “preservative of all rights.”3 We know that voting is sacred. Yet we are
still searching for a solution to the puzzle of how best to protect voting rights. On the
fiftieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act, as voting rights advocates and scholars
reflect on the history of voting protections and propose new reforms, the answer to
this question is right in front of us: state constitutions and state courts.
Part of the difficulty in protecting the right to vote as robustly as possible is that
the U.S. Constitution does not provide an explicit individual right to vote. This might
seem surprising given that voting is one of our most cherished rights.4 But the U.S.
Constitution confers only “negative” rights, or prohibitions on governmental action,
as opposed to specifically stated grants of individual liberties.5 Yet virtually every state
constitution confers the right to vote to its citizens in explicit terms. Moreover, the
U.S. Constitution directs the inquiry over voter eligibility to state sources. 6 As Justice
Scalia recently declared, the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution “empowers
Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them,”7
and instead leaves voter eligibility rules to the states.
Why, then, has this avenue of protecting the right to vote not garnered more sup
port? There are several possible reasons. First, even though state courts are primary
actors in shaping the right to vote, most people pay less attention to state judges than
to their federal counterparts. The media, for example, spend relatively little time

* Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College
of Law. This Issue Brief is a summary of two scholarly articles on the topic of the right to vote and state
court decision making: Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 Ohio State L.J. 1 (forth
coming 2016) and Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 89
(2014). Thanks to both the Vanderbilt Law Review and the Ohio State Law Journal for granting permission
to reprint some of this material. Thanks also to Nathaniel Fowler for his assistance in distilling the two
articles into this Issue Brief. Finally, thanks to The Proteus Fund for sponsoring some of this research.
1 E.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see also Joshua A. Douglas, Is
the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 143, 145 (2008); Richard L. Hasen,
Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 377, 378–79 (2001).
2 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
3 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
4 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 144–45.
5 See, e.g., Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our Rights: The Right to
Health in State Constitutions, 60 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 997, 1005 (2010).
6 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
7 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2250 (2013).
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covering state voting rights decisions. 8 Most election law scholars focus primarily on
decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court. This is inherently backward given how active
state courts are in regulating the voting process.9 Another, and perhaps weightier,
reason is that state courts, much like federal courts, have largely underenforced the
right to vote because they have too closely followed federal voting-rights jurisprudence.
A renewed focus on the power of state constitutions and state judges provides a solu
tion for how best to protect the fundamental right to vote.
This Issue Brief details the scope of voting rights under state constitutions, an
overlooked source of the right to vote. Part I considers both the lack of a federal con
stitutional right to vote and the explicit right mentioned in virtually all state constitu
tions. Part II describes recent state-level voter ID cases, providing a summary of how
courts facing litigation over voter ID laws have employed their state constitutions.
Part III contends that state courts, instead of simply following narrow federal juris
prudence in “lockstep,” should give broader, independent force to their explicit state
constitutional provisions conferring the right to vote. Part IV highlights how different
state judges construe their state constitutions, either broadly or narrowly, with respect
to voting rights and posits that we should consider both judicial ideology and the
method of judicial selection if we seek broad enforcement of these state constitutional
provisions. Finally, an Appendix presents a chart, initially published in the Vanderbilt
Law Review, illustrating all fifty state constitutions and the language they employ for
the right to vote.10

I.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE RIGHT TO VOTE

There are two sources of constitutional rights: the U.S. Constitution and state
constitutions. Because the former is the “Supreme Law of the Land,” it provides the
“floor” of individual rights.11 State constitutions, on the other hand, can grant more
robust rights. Following this formula, although the U.S. Constitution merely implies
the right to vote, almost all state constitutions explicitly enumerate this right. Because
the right to vote provides the foundation of our democracy,12 we must understand
comprehensively the differing scope of federal and state constitutional protection. This
Part provides details on how the U.S. Constitution and each of the fifty state constitu
tions treat the right to vote.
A. The Lack of a Specifically Enumerated Federal Right to Vote

As stated above, the U.S. Constitution does not confer the right to vote explicitly.
Rather, it sets limitations on the government’s ability to curtail voting rights. The
Constitution mentions individual voting seven times—in Article I, Section 2 and in
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
8 See Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 Ky. L.J. 553, 567 (2014) (citing Martin
Kaplan, Ken Goldstein & Matthew Hale, Local News Coverage of the 2004 Campaign: An Analysis of
Nightly Broadcasts in 11 Markets, Local News Archive 9–12, 28–29 (Feb. 15, 2005), http://www.localnews
archive.org/pdf/LCLNAFinal2004.pdf).
9 As a general matter state courts issue thousands more decisions than federal courts every year, af
fecting millions more people. See Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme
Courts, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 455, 456–57 (2010).
10 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 Vand. L. R ev. 89,
144–49 (2014).
11 See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (noting that a state constitution may
afford greater protections than the U.S. Constitution).
12 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964).
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Amendments—but none of those provisions actually grant a right to vote to U.S. citi
zens.13 Article I, Section 2 provides that, in electing members of the House of
Representatives, “electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for elec
tors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”14 That is, the U.S.
Constitution does not provide the qualifications for voters itself but instead delegates
that responsibility to the states, applying state eligibility rules to federal elections. The
Seventeenth Amendment has the same language for the election of U.S. Senators.15
The Fourteenth Amendment’s “Reduction in Representation” Clause provides that if
a state denies the right to vote to eligible citizens (except based on participation in a
rebellion or other crime), the state loses representation in its Congressional delega
tion.16 This clause does not provide citizens the right to vote as an explicit liberty but
instead details a potential penalty states will suffer if they deny that right. The
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments all speak in
the passive voice, providing that the right to vote “shall not be denied” according to
race (Fifteenth),17 sex (Nineteenth),18 ability to pay a poll tax (Twenty-Fourth),19 or
age (Twenty-Sixth). 20
Given all of these textual sources of the right to vote—albeit negatively implied—it
might seem surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has not relied on these provisions
but instead has located the federal right to vote within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. 21 The genesis of modern voting-rights jurisprudence comes
from Baker v. Carr, a 1962 case in which the Supreme Court declared that “[a] citizen’s
right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recog
nized as a right secured by the Constitution.”22 Subsequent cases placed the right to
vote squarely within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. For exam
ple, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court acknowledged that although
the U.S. Constitution does not specifically confer a right to vote in state elections,
“once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”23
Later cases, however, lowered the judicial scrutiny that regulations on the right to
vote receive. In Anderson v. Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi, the Court developed
a framework for considering federal constitutional challenges to state voting

13 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of
Mirrors, 115 H arv. L. R ev. 170, 208 (2001) (contrasting the fact that “nothing in the U.S. Constitution
mentions a ‘right to vote’ in a presidential election” with the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in Bush v.
Gore that “[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote
as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental”). There have been frequent calls to amend the U.S.
Constitution to include an explicit grant of the right to vote, but these proposed amendments so far have
not had much traction. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hjres44ih/pdf/BILLS-113hjres44ih.pdf.
14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
15 Id. amend. XVII.
16 Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
17 Id. amend. XV.
18 Id. amend. XIX.
19 Id. amend. XXIV.
20 Id. amend. XXVI.
21 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964); see Akhil Reed
Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By 186 (2012).
22 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
23 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
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regulations.24 Known as the Anderson-Burdick “severe burden” test, courts first deter
mine whether the state law in question imposes a severe burden on voters. 25 If it does,
then the Court applies strict scrutiny review. 26 If the burden is less than severe, how
ever, then the Court applies a lower, intermediate level of scrutiny, in which it balances
the burdens the law does impose against the state’s regulatory interests. If the state’s
interests outweigh the burden on voting, then the state law is valid, despite the fact
that it nevertheless might restrict a so-called fundamental right. 27 At the federal level,
in other words, some state impediments to voting are constitutionally permissible, so
long as the burden is not too severe. The federal constitutional protection for the right
to vote is thus not particularly robust, either textually or under recent case law.
B. State Constitutional Grants of the Right to Vote

In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, all fifty states provide explicit voting protec
tion for their citizens. This section sets out the scope of that right, detailing state
constitutional provisions on voter qualifications.
Forty-nine states explicitly grant the right to vote through specific language in their
state constitutions. 28 Most of these provisions directly define who is eligible to vote,
such as Wisconsin’s, which states that “[e]very United States citizen age 18 or older
who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified elector of that
district.”29 That is, state constitutions grant voting rights to all individuals who are
citizens of the United States, residents of the state for a certain period preceding the
election, and over eighteen years old. Certain state constitutions then explicitly deny
voting rights to convicted felons or mentally incompetent persons. 30 A few state con
stitutions allow the state’s legislature to enact other “necessary” voting procedures to
root out fraud or protect the integrity of the election process. 31 But at bottom, state
constitutions include specific language granting voting rights to the state’s citizens.
As an added level of protection, twenty-six states include a provision in their con
stitutions stating that elections shall be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and open.”32
Although these terms might seem amorphous, several state courts have construed this
language as guaranteeing all eligible voters access to the ballot. As Kentucky’s highest
court long ago explained—in a passage that several other courts have cited 33 —a con
stitutional provision declaring elections to be “free and equal” is “mandatory”: “It
applies to all elections, and no election can be free and equal, within its meaning, if
any substantial number of persons entitled to vote are denied the right to do so.”34
24 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992));
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983).
25 Id.
26 Burdick, 502 U.S. at 433–34.
27 See generally Douglas, supra note 1, at 174 (discussing how the use of the severe burden test suggests
that the Court does not always consider the right to vote to be a “fundamental right”).
28 See infra Appendix. The only state constitution that does not include explicit language granting the
right to vote is Arizona’s, which instead provides that no one shall have the right to vote unless they meet
the citizenship, residency, and age requirements. This language still grants the right to vote, albeit in the
reverse of all other states, because it provides who may not vote (no one unless they meet the state’s eligibil
ity requirements).
29 Wis. Const. art. III, § 1.
30 See, e.g., Ky. Const. § 145.
31 See, e.g., Del. Const. art. V, § 1; Md. Const. art. I, § 7.
32 See infra Appendix.
33 Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1016 (N.M. 2001).
34 Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 175 S.W. 1022, 1026–27 (Ky. 1915).
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Finally, fifteen state constitutions mirror the U.S. Constitution in delineating voting
rights through indirect, negative language declaring when the state may not infringe
the right to vote on the basis of certain characteristics. 35 Table 1 summarizes these
state constitutional provisions on the right to vote.
Table 1: State Constitutional Provisions on the Right to Vote

State Constitutional Provision

Number of States

Explicit grant of the right to vote

49

Elections shall be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and open”

26

Implicit grant of the right to vote through negative language

15

In sum, state constitutions go well beyond the U.S. Constitution in protecting the
right to vote. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, these state constitutional provisions explic
itly grant the right to vote to all citizens who meet simple qualification rules. As dis
cussed below, state courts should not interpret such broad constitutional provisions
to be coextensive (or in “lockstep”) with the more limited federal jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution explicitly points to state voter
eligibility rules for determining voter qualifications in federal elections, suggesting the
paramount importance of these state constitutional provisions. State court jurispru
dence also should be more robust than federal law because state constitutions go
further than the U.S. Constitution in specifically conferring voting rights. That is, a
faithful understanding of federal and state constitutional structure and of the differ
ences between how each document grants voting rights counsel toward recognizing
state constitutions’ independent force.

II.

STATE JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State courts construe state constitutional provisions regarding individual rights
either in lockstep with federal jurisprudence or more independently and robustly. This
Part outlines the lockstep and non-lockstep methods and explains how state courts
have construed voting-rights provisions under each interpretive lens in recent voter
ID litigation.
A. Lockstep

The U.S. Constitution establishes the federal floor of individual rights because the
Supremacy Clause forbids states from providing less protection than what the U.S.
Constitution guarantees. 36 When state courts lockstep, they follow the U.S. Supreme
Court’s lead in construing the scope of these individual rights, and in essence analyze
the analogous rights in the state constitution as conferring the same level of protection
35

See infra Appendix.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in
the Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 865, 875 (2007).
36
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as their federal counterparts. 37 State courts that follow the lockstep approach will
provide the exact same protection for the right as federal courts do under the U.S.
Constitution. 38 But this is problematic when federal protection is insufficient, as is the
case with voting rights.
Lockstepping is fairly common with regard to the right to vote. 39 A prominent,
recent example comes from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. On July 31, 2014, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court issued two opinions, one 5-2 and the other 4-3, upholding
the state’s voter ID law, following both the U.S. Supreme Court and prior state court
decisions in its analysis.40
Initially two Wisconsin trial courts held that the state’s voter ID law imposed an
impermissible qualification for voting under the Wisconsin Constitution.41 In both
cases, plaintiffs challenged the voter ID requirements only under the Wisconsin
Constitution, not the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs invoked
Article III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that all persons
age 18 or older are qualified electors of the district in which they reside.42 Presumably,
the plaintiffs focused their argument on the Wisconsin Constitution and did not invoke
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because they wished to avoid
an analysis under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Crawford v. Marion
County, 43 in which the Court upheld a similar Indiana law under the AndersonBurdick “severe burden” balancing test. This proved successful at the trial court, with
one court explicitly distinguishing Crawford by noting, “this case is founded upon the
Wisconsin Constitution which expressly guarantees the right to vote while Crawford
was based upon the U.S. Constitution which offers no such guarantee.”44
But that strategy failed before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, largely because that
court followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead to construe the state constitution. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the state’s voter ID requirement, adopting federal
jurisprudence for the state constitutional question to conclude that the law did not add
an additional qualification to vote and did not impose an undue burden on voting.45
In the 5-2 decision, the court found that the voter ID provision did not add an addi
tional qualification to vote beyond what the state constitution allows; in the 4-3 deci
sion, the majority found that the voter ID requirement was not overly burdensome.46
37

See id. at 875, 880.
See id. at 881.
39 As one commentator notes, lockstepping is the prevailing norm for most state constitutional adju
dication. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century,
35 Ind. L. Rev. 335, 338 (2002).
40 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 469 (Wisc. 2014); League of Women Voters
of Wis. Educ. Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wisc. July 31, 2014).
41 See League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 2012 WL
763586 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL
739553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2012).
42 See Wis. Const. art. III, § 1.
43 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
44 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 2012 WL 739553 at *1.
45 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 357 Wis.2d at 469; League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ.
Network, 357 Wis.2d at 360.
46 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 357 Wis.2d at 469; League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ.
Network, 357 Wis.2d at 360. Justice Crook joined the majority in League of Women Voters, the 5-2 deci
sion, but joined the dissent in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, the 4-3 ruling. He wrote separately in
League of Women Voters to explain that his decision in that case rested largely on the fact that the plaintiffs
brought only a facial challenge to the law. He dissented in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, however,
finding that the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence of specific burdens the law imposed on voters.
38
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Throughout both cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and analysis in Crawford. In fact, in the 4-3 decision,
the court explicitly followed the Supreme Court’s lead in Crawford by stating that it
would “structure [its] discussion of plaintiffs’ challenges to [the voter ID law] consis
tent with the method of analysis employed in Burdick and Anderson …”47 Although
the court did not explicitly state that it was lockstepping the scope of voting rights
under Wisconsin’s Constitution with the U.S. Constitution, its mode of analysis placed
the two protections of the right to vote in “absolute harmony.”48 This interpretation
means that Wisconsin’s explicit grant of voting rights in its constitution is in lockstep
with the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause—even though those two provi
sions are textually and substantively different. The U.S. Constitution does not explic
itly grant the right to vote, while the Wisconsin Constitution does, yet the court
construed the two constitutions to be coextensive and therefore substantively identical.
This suggests that the Wisconsin Constitution’s explicit grant of the right to vote is
irrelevant because the court simply followed the U.S. Constitution’s lead even though
it lacks the same substantive provision.
In sum, even though virtually every state constitution contains a provision that
explicitly grants the right to vote to its residents, many state courts, like the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, have not construed those provisions to have any separate meaning
from federal voting-rights jurisprudence under the U.S. Constitution. Instead, these
state courts use the lockstep method to define the scope of the clauses in their constitu
tions, typically rejecting challenges to a state’s practice in the process. This analysis
has an inherent dissonance, as state courts are lockstepping a specific and explicit
state voter qualification provision with federal court interpretation of the implied right
to vote within the general language of the federal Equal Protection Clause. The result
is often a derogation of citizens’ constitutional right to vote.
B. Non-lockstep

Instead of using a lockstep approach, some state courts recognize that their con
stitutions go further than the U.S. Constitution in conferring voting rights. This meth
odology gives state constitutions significant authority in protecting individual rights
because it is not hampered by the more limited federal analysis.
State courts employing a non-lockstep approach start with the notion that their
state constitution may be broader than the U.S. Constitution.49 A court’s analysis thus
begins and often ends with the state constitution, and the court considers the federal
floor only if the state constitution does not cover the right in question. 50 Federal con
stitutional interpretation is merely persuasive in non-lockstep state jurisprudence, with
no presumptive validity. 51
The Missouri Supreme Court, in its 2006 voter ID decision, set out the reasons for
using this state-focused method quite nicely, contrasting the voter protection provisions
in both the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions. 52 The Missouri court recognized that,
47

Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 357 Wis.2d at 490.
See Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Speech, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument:
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 635, 645 (1987).
49 See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 36, at 885.
50 See id. at 885; see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 48, at 647.
51 Utter & Pitler, supra note 48, at 647.
52 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211–12 (Mo. 2006) (“The express constitutional protection of
the right to vote differentiates the Missouri constitution from its federal counterpart . . .”)
48
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although both the U.S. Constitution and the state’s constitution safeguard the right
to vote, the broader state constitution provides independent and explicit voting pro
tection.53 So construed, the voter ID law violated the Missouri Constitution’s conferral
to Missouri citizens of a “fundamental right to vote.”54 The court acknowledged that
the U.S. Constitution still provides a floor of protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 55 But the court, while giving credence to the
U.S. Constitution’s more limited protection of voting rights, focused its analysis on
the Missouri Constitution. Missouri’s constitution goes beyond the federal floor, so
regardless of whether the law was permissible under the U.S. Constitution, the court
invalidated it under the state constitution using the non-lockstep methodology.
Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in rejecting that state’s voter ID law more
recently, also recognized the primacy and independence of the state constitution’s
conferral of voting rights. 56 The court found that the four qualifications listed in the
Arkansas Constitution (U.S. citizen, Arkansas resident, over 18, and lawfully regis
tered) “simply do not include any proof-of-identity requirement.”57 The court also
refused to rely on Crawford or on cases from other jurisdictions, explaining that “those
courts interpreted the United States Constitution or their respective states’ constitu
tions, and here, we address the present issue solely under the Arkansas Constitution.”58
The main benefit of the non-lockstep approach for the constitutional right to vote
is that it gives full force to the broader protection of voting rights contained within
state constitutions. Federal case law interpreting the Equal Protection Clause is still
important because it furnishes a baseline of constitutional protection for the right to
vote, couched in terms of equality. It therefore provides a framework for a lower limit
on the kinds of election regulations states may impose. But state constitutions are more
explicit than the U.S. Constitution when it comes to the right to vote. State constitu
tions, interpreted through a non-lockstep methodology, thus confer a more robust
complement to federal Equal Protection Clause analysis. As explained below, there
are strong reasons for a widespread adoption of a non-lockstep approach for all state
constitutional cases involving the fundamental, constitutional right to vote.

III. A NON-LOCKSTEP APPROACH PROVIDES THE BEST
INTERPRETATIVE METHOD FOR THE RIGHT TO VOTE
A. The Problems with Lockstepping the
Constitutional Right to Vote

Textually and jurisprudentially, a non-lockstep analysis presents the best approach
to construe the constitutional right to vote. There are at least three reasons to reject
a lockstep methodology to interpreting voting rights under state constitutions.
First, the text of the U.S. Constitution says that states will determine voter quali
fications.59 The U.S. Constitution does not define who has the right to vote; it delegates
that responsibility to the states. In turn, and unlike the U.S. Constitution, state con
stitutions specifically grant voting rights to the state’s residents. Therefore, if we are
53 Id. at 216 (“Here, the issue is constitutionality under Missouri’s Constitution, not under the United
States Constitution.”).
54 Id. at 212–13 (citing Mo. Const. art. I, § 25).
55 Id. at 216.
56 See Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2014).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. amend. XVII.

The Journal of the ACS Issue Briefs

29

faithful to the U.S. Constitution’s delegation of voter eligibility rules to the states, then
there is little with which to lockstep, beyond the amorphous standards of the Equal
Protection Clause. It is incongruent to lockstep a state’s more specific voting rules with
a completely different general provision of the U.S. Constitution that actually says
nothing directly about the right to vote.
Second, the history of the constitutional structure for voting rights portends a
greater role for state definitions of the right to vote. Well before the adoption of the
U.S. Constitution, state constitutions already granted the right to vote to the state’s
citizens. The Founding Fathers likely felt no need to insert a right-to-vote provision
in the U.S. Constitution due to the preceding direct state grants of that right. 60 Instead,
the drafters provided in Article I, Section 2 that voter eligibility for federal elections
was dependent on state eligibility rules. This provision was a “compromise, an out
growth both of an ideologically divided constitutional convention and the practical
politics of constitutional ratification,” but it was possible specifically because state
constitutions already conferred the right to vote. 61 Accordingly, we need not locate the
right to vote in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, especially given
that it exists already within state constitutions. 62
Third, lockstepping goes against the ideal of judicial federalism, which suggests
that state constitutions should play a significant role in protecting individual liberties.
As Justice Brennan explained in his seminal Harvard Law Review article, state courts
should give their constitutions independent force when they disagree with U.S. Supreme
Court decisions on an important issue of individual liberties. 63 State courts that
robustly protect rights can help to check more restrictive federal jurisprudence and,
ultimately, national power. 64 State courts should therefore use a state-focused,
federalist-driven, non-lockstep method that allows them to recognize state constitu
tions as more protective of voting rights than the U.S. Constitution.
B. The Presumptive Invalidity of Election Laws
That Add Voter Qualifications

A non-lockstep approach to state constitutional interpretation of the right to vote
rejects the U.S. Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick standard as too deferential to
state regulation of elections, as that test fails to recognize the explicit right of suffrage
within state constitutions. But in its place, state courts need a workable test that ele
vates the importance of the fundamental right to vote while still allowing jurisdictions
60 For a fuller historical picture of founding era understanding of the Elections Clause and voter
qualification rules, see Kirsten Nussbaumer, Republican Election Reform and the American Montesquieu
12–13 (June 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1898406 (discussing the tradition of “fixing suffrage” through constitutional text).
61 See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote 21 (2009).
62 Amar, supra note 21, at 186–87 (explaining that, at the time of its adoption, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was not understood to encompass voting rights).
63 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489, 502 (1977); cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1221 (1978) (positing that “constitutional norms which are
underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual
limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood as delineating
only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm”).
64 See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a
Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1033 (2003) (“State judicial rejection of exces
sively narrow Supreme Court precedents concerning the scope of individual rights helps check national
power in at least four ways.”).
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to run their elections. Again, the solution is right in front of us: the structure of state
constitutions. Courts simply need to apply faithfully what state constitutions say.
1. State Constitutional Structure
As discussed above, all but one state constitution explicitly grants to its citizens the
right to vote. Most of these constitutional provisions are couched in mandatory terms:
all citizens “are qualified electors” or “shall be entitled to vote” so long as they are U.S.
citizens, residents of the state for a certain time, and over eighteen years of age. 65
State constitutions, as previously noted, also delegate authority to state legislatures
to regulate elections, but this comes only after the state constitutions confer voting
rights. That is, the right to regulate elections is derivative of the people’s right to vote.
As one Wisconsin trial court considering a voter ID law explained, the citizenry of the
state ratified the constitution, so the citizen’s right to vote arises first, and legislative
authority to alter that right follows. 66 In addition, the constitutional power state leg
islatures enjoy is based on permissive language and is often limited to regulating only
certain aspects of the election process. Pennsylvania citizens, for example, “shall be
entitled to vote at all elections subject … to such laws requiring and regulating the
registration of electors as the General Assembly may enact.”67 Other state constitutions
allow legislatures to pass laws involving absentee balloting or felon disenfranchise
ment. 68 Some state constitutions also permit the legislature to enact laws to “preserve
the integrity” of elections or “guard against abuses of the elective power.”69
State constitutions thus grant the right to vote in mandatory terms and only sec
ondarily delegate legislative control to regulate some aspects of the election process.
The constitution, not the legislature, confers the right to vote, so the legislature’s power
cannot completely override this constitutional grant. A primary conferral of the right
to vote, which then may be subject to legislative authority, is the only way to understand
properly both the textual and contextual grant of voting rights. That is, the legisla
ture’s power cannot outweigh the mandatory nature of the constitution’s voting pro
tection. Courts construing these provisions in harmony, then, must give full effect to
the mandatory, explicit nature of voting rights while still providing the legislature with
room to regulate elections consistent with constitutional authorization.
2. A Two-Part Test for the State Constitutional Right to Vote
Given the foregoing analysis, a court considering a state constitutional challenge
to an election regulation should ask two separate questions: (1) whether the law at
issue infringes upon the explicit constitutional grant of voting rights by adding an
additional qualification, and then (2) whether the exercise of the legislature’s power
can outweigh that mandatory right. The plaintiff should have the burden of showing
that the regulation in question imposes an additional voter qualification, while the
state should have the ultimate burden of justifying such a law.
A plaintiff satisfies his or her initial burden under this proposed test by showing
that the law creates categories—those who may vote and those who may not—based
65

See, e.g., Pa. Const. art. VII, § 1.
Order Granting Motion for Temporary Injunction, Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker,
No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 6, 2012).
67 Pa. Const. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added).
68 See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. V, § 4 (registration and absentee balloting); Kan. Const. art. V, § 2 (felon
disenfranchisement).
69 See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. IV, § 11; N.M. Const. art. V, § 1.
66
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on additional criteria not listed in the state constitution. For example, a voter ID law,
in a state in which many voters do not have an ID and face substantial burdens in
obtaining one, can be seen as an additional qualification because those voters who
satisfy all other eligibility rules still may not vote without possessing an ID. Having an
ID has become a qualification. In this scenario (which is the reality in most states with
strict ID requirements) a voter ID law does more than just enforce the constitutionallyenumerated eligibility rules, because those who meet the valid qualifications may still
suffer disenfranchisement if they do not also have the ID. Put another way, if every
voter possessed a valid ID, then the ID law would not be an additional qualification
because it would not impose a status requirement on voters that some people cannot
easily meet. Everyone would still be eligible to vote regardless of the voter ID law
because everyone would have one, and the law would be regulating the process of vot
ing instead of delineating an additional qualification. But that is not the reality of many
of today’s voter ID laws. To be sure, a voter ID law in a state in which everyone owned
an ID still might impose an added burden on voters—of bringing and presenting the
ID—but this is different in kind from distinguishing between which voters may cast a
ballot based on possession of an ID when not everyone can easily obtain one. If having
an ID is not a universal trait, or the state does not otherwise accommodate those with
out one, then the requirement turns into an additional voter qualification.
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a law imposes an additional qualification on the
right to vote, it is then the state’s burden to show why the law is a permissible exercise
of its legislative authority. To do so, the legislature must present specific findings on
why the law in question does not infringe the state constitution’s explicit provision of
voting rights to its citizens. Without specific findings, a legislature might curtail the
constitutional right to vote through general legislative declarations—contrary to the
text and structure of state constitutions.
This proposal flips the normal burden in constitutional voting-rights litigation.
Under the federal Anderson-Burdick test, the plaintiff has the obligation to show that
the law in question burdens the right to vote to a severe level.70 If the plaintiff cannot
do so, then a lockstepping state court following Anderson-Burdick will apply an
intermediate balancing test that largely defers to the state’s justifications for the law.71
In essence, “laws pertaining to electoral mechanics carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality, even though they touch upon the fundamental rights of voting and
political association.”72 Under Anderson-Burdick, then, the plaintiff assumes the ulti
mate burden of proving the law’s invalidity by demonstrating the barriers the law
imposes on voting rights, and the court typically credits whatever justification the state
posits for its election regulation.73 A court following Anderson-Burdick will reverse
the presumption of validity and hold the state to a higher threshold only if the court
finds that the law imposes a severe burden.74
Flipping the normal federal framework and imposing a presumption of invalidity
to laws that add voter qualifications is justified because state constitutions already
support this analytical move. They explicitly confer the right to vote as an initial
70

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
Id.; see Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 553 (2015).
72 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and
Opportunities, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 313, 336 (2007).
73 See id. at 323; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see also Douglas, supra note 71 (discussing the Court’s undue
deference to states in the interest prong of the constitutional analysis).
74 See Elmendorf, supra note 72, at 336–37.
71
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matter, subject only later to a grant of power that the state legislature may invoke.
This is evident through the mandatory nature of the voting-rights provisions, the
permissive language authorizing legislative regulation, and the simple fact that a leg
islature’s power cannot override the explicit constitutional conferral of the fundamen
tal right to vote. Courts should therefore consider a law that adds additional voter
qualifications to be presumptively invalid under the state constitution because the law
is contrary to the constitution’s explicit grant of the right to vote. The state should
then have the burden of overcoming that presumption with direct evidence showing
that the law is consistent with the state constitution’s specific conferral of legislative
power to regulate elections.
This two-part, burden-shifting analysis is akin to strict scrutiny, requiring the state
to justify an election regulation by demonstrating how it is tied specifically to the
legislature’s power. 75 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “under our
Constitution … the States are given the initial task of determining the qualifications
of voters who will elect members of Congress.”76 A close analysis of state constitutions
reveals that those documents explicitly grant the right to vote in unequivocal terms,
subject only to a few enumerated status qualifications and to the legislature’s authority,
which is limited to certain areas in most states. Thus, state constitutions themselves
suggest that legislatures must justify the imposition of additional voter qualifications
that infringe the right to vote. An analysis that is similar to federal strict scrutiny
review comes directly from the state constitutional text and structure, as well as the
fundamental nature of the right to vote.77
This formulation does not require widespread judicial oversight of elections, how
ever, as states should be able to overcome the presumption of invalidity in most instances
for run-of-the-mill election-administration laws. States need to regulate how an election
should operate. Many election-related laws, moreover, do not impose additional voter
qualifications but instead are about other mechanics of the election process, such as
ballot access requirements for candidates or campaign finance regulations.78 But when
a plaintiff can demonstrate that a particular law adds an additional voting qualification
beyond what the state constitution permits, courts should consider the law presump
tively invalid under the constitutional text. The state should then have the burden of
showing with specific evidence why it was justified in passing that law. This mode of
analysis is most faithful to a non-lockstep approach to constitutional protection of the
right to vote and adheres most closely to state constitutional text and structure.

IV.

SELECTING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES WHO WILL
ROBUSTLY PROTECT THE RIGHT TO VOTE

Some state judges are better than others in broadly construing voting rights and
therefore are more likely to adopt the two-part analysis described above. After all, a
75 Using heightened scrutiny and rejecting deference to state legislatures for impediments to voting
rights was the original formulation of the Warren Court’s right-to-vote decisions. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969) (“Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny some
residents the right to vote, the general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the
traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a ‘rational basis’ for the distinc
tions made are not applicable.”).
76 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729–30 (1974) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1).
77 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. Rev.
1269, 1295 (2002).
78 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 178 (distinguishing between laws that directly impact voters with laws
that only tangentially affect voters by regulating other aspects of the election process).
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judge who is predisposed to lockstep the state constitutional protection of voting rights
with limited federal jurisprudence or otherwise narrowly construe the right to vote is
unlikely to follow the proposed test. An evaluation of state right-to-vote cases may tell
us whether ideologically liberal versus conservative judges, as well as elected versus
appointed judges, are better at broadly construing the state-conferred constitutional
right to vote. If the right to vote is the most fundamental right in our democracy,79 then
we should favor judges who will issue rulings that robustly protect that right for all
voters. This Part provides a jumping off point for analyzing how ideology and methods
of judicial selection may help to determine how a potential judge will construe the
constitutional right to vote. Although the data is preliminary, and further studies are
needed, it appears that liberal and appointed judges may be better at robustly constru
ing the right to vote as compared to their conservative and elected counterparts.
A. Political Ideology

Liberal judges tend to view individual rights broadly, granting fuller protection to
plaintiffs asserting these rights against state regulation, while conservative judges
analyze them more narrowly. 80 For example, court decisions in Wisconsin, Michigan,
and Georgia have seemingly tracked the sitting judges’ ideologies, with the liberal
judges ruling in favor of broader protection of the right to vote and conservative judges
going in the opposite direction. 81 Of course, ideology is not the only driver of judicial
decision making, as legal analysis is based on law, precedent, and the facts of a par
ticular case.82 That said, ideology often correlates with the outcome in a case, especially
on highly-partisan issues such as election law and voting rights. 83 It should come as
no surprise, then, that a judge’s analysis of the constitutional right to vote often cor
relates with his or her ideology. The link between ideology and interpretation of the
constitutional right to vote is most poignant in decisions on voter ID laws. 84 Most
(although not all) of the state judges ruling on voter ID laws in the past decade have

79 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Foundational Importance of Voting: A Response to Professor Flanders,
66 Okla. L. Rev. 81 (2013).
80 Prior empirical studies have shown that liberal and conservative judges rule differently on various
election law issues. For example, Professors Adam Cox and Thomas Miles have found that ideology, based
on the partisanship of the appointing President, correlates strongly with how a federal judge rules in a
Voting Rights Act case. See Adam B. Cox & and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 19–25 (2008). Similarly, Professors Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd have found that
state judges’ rulings are often consistent with the views of the political parties that funded their election
campaigns. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign
Finance, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239 (2013).
81 See Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 Ohio State L.J. 1 (forthcoming
2016). An important caveat is required here: I am not attempting a quantitative empirical analysis, and the
sample size is relatively small, so the conclusions are necessarily tentative. Also, the direction of influence
is unclear: does ideology affect the decision, or is the decision simply evidence of the judge’s ideology? But
the analysis at least provides a first step in showing that the political identity of the judges may matter
when deciding a voting rights controversy.
82 See, e.g., Kyle C. Kopko, Partisanship Suppressed: Judicial Decision-Making in Ralph Nader’s 2004
Ballot Access Litigation, 7 Election L.J. 301, 302 (2008).
83 See, e.g., Kyle Kopko, The Effect of Partisanship in Election Law Judicial Decision-Making (2010)
(electronic theses and dissertation, Ohio State University), available at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_fi
le?accession=osu1275415061&disposition=inline.
84 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for A Structural
Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 643, 647 (2008).
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followed their ideological predilections. 85 Liberal judges construe the constitutional
right to vote broadly and therefore view voter ID laws skeptically, while conservative
judges do the opposite. 86
Although not every Democratic or liberal judge is going to invalidate a voter ID
law, and not every Republican or conservative judge is going to uphold a voter ID
requirement, there is still a discernable trend, particularly regarding the scope of
protection afforded to the constitutional right to vote under state constitutions. It may
not be possible to categorize all judges along an ideological spectrum, and a judge’s
constitutional analysis on this issue may have nothing to do with his or her personal
ideological predilections. Moreover, voter ID laws come in different shapes and sizes,
and some laws – such as the ones in Rhode Island or Colorado87 – do not necessarily
infringe the fundamental right to vote or impose a qualification because all voters can
easily comply with no added burden. Regardless, the analysis shows that who is decid
ing these cases can matter a great deal88 because liberal-leaning judges seem to under
stand more clearly that state constitutions provide broad protection to the individual
right to vote that goes beyond federal jurisprudence.
B. Judicial Selection

Voting rights cases often involve challenges to state laws that have the effect of
making it harder for typically disfavored groups to vote, such as poor people, minori
ties, felons, or people with disabilities. Perhaps judges are more likely to rule broadly
in construing voting rights for these individuals if the judges are more isolated from
the political process by being appointed instead of elected, or if they face merely a
retention election instead of a campaign against an opponent. Prior studies show that
elected judges tend to pay more attention to public opinion than appointed judges or
judges who must win only a “yes” or “no” retention vote to stay on the bench. 89
Retention elections for appointed judges are usually boring affairs with little political
drama, but elected judges must actively campaign because they must beat an opponent
who also wants the seat.90 The theory, then, is that an elected judge may be less likely
to rule in favor of a political minority than an appointed judge who will not worry as
much about the potential backlash from a vigorous campaign.91
The initial evidence suggests that, for issues that are not already highly ideological,
appointed judges or judges who will face only retention elections are better at broadly
construing the right to vote and including political minorities in the democratic
85 For a detailed discussion of ideology and recent state court voter ID decisions, see Joshua A. Douglas,
State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 Ohio State L.J. 1 (forthcoming 2016).
86 See Elmendorf, supra note 82.
87 See Justin Levitt, Rhode Island Voter ID Follow-up, Election Law Blog (May 23, 2012), http://
electionlawblog.org/?p=34694; Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson, No. 04-CV-7709, 2004 WL 2360485
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004).
88 See Elmendorf, supra note 84, at 647 (considering both federal and state voter ID decisions and
finding that, as of 2008, “there have been fourteen votes by Democratic judges against the constitutionality
of photo-ID requirements, and only three votes indicating that the requirement at issue is permissible. For
Republican judges, the respective numbers are three (against constitutionality) and fifteen (for
constitutionality).”
89 See Damon M. Cann & Teena Wilhelm, Case Visibility and the Electoral Connection in State
Supreme Courts, 39 Am. Pol. Res. 557, 570 (2011).
90 See Andrea McArdle, The Increasingly Fractious Politics of Nonpartisan Judicial Selection:
Accountability Challenges to Merit-based Reform, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 1799, 1805–06 (2011–2012).
91 See e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62
U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 694 (1995).
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process.92 For instance, courts in California, Iowa, and Tennessee ruled that the state
could not disenfranchise the (former felon) plaintiffs who brought suit, thus limiting
the scope of the states’ felon disenfranchisement laws; judges in these states are
appointed initially and must withstand retention elections to keep their seats.93 These
cases exemplify how appointed judges tend to rule broadly and independently of federal
jurisprudence when construing their state constitutions’ grant of the right to vote,
especially in cases involving felon disenfranchisement or the voting process.94 This find
ing adds data to the robust and complex debate over methods of judicial selection.

V.

CONCLUSION

There have been myriad calls for Congress or the federal courts to fix voting-rights
jurisprudence to give broader protection to the individual right to vote.95 But the solu
tion is in plain sight if state courts simply read state constitutions faithfully to their
text and independently from federal jurisprudence. In locating the right to vote, we too
often look solely at the implied right under the U.S. Constitution’s negative language
and the Equal Protection Clause. Construing a voting regulation under the U.S.
Constitution, however, presents only half of the inquiry. Almost all state constitutions
grant citizens the right to vote through explicit, direct language. Yet many state courts
interpret their own state’s constitution to be in lockstep with federal constitutional law.
This lockstepping approach is backwards. The U.S. Constitution directs the inquiry
about voting qualifications to the states, not the other way around.96 Moreover, it
makes little sense to lockstep a state constitution’s specific grant of voting rights with
the very different implied right under the general language of the federal Equal
Protection Clause. Courts construing restrictions on voting rights should consider the
broader scope of state constitutions.
The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has contracted the scope of the right to vote
under the federal Equal Protection Clause.97 A renewed, independent focus on state
constitutions and their explicit grant of the right to vote is textually faithful to both
the U.S. and state constitutions and will restore the importance of the most founda
tional right in our democracy. The best way to achieve this renewed focus is to select
judges who will embody and protect the fundamental importance of the right to vote.

92 For a detailed discussion of methods of judicial selection and recent state court voting rights cases,
see Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 Ohio State L.J. 1 (forthcoming 2016).
93 League of Women Voters of Cal. v. McPherson, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1469 (Cal. App. 2006); Chiodo
v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 2014); May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2008).
94 See Douglas, supra note 92.
95 See, e.g., Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: Confronting
America’s Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 Election L.J. 559, 572 (2004); see also Brad Plumer, ‘We Have
to Fix That,’ but Will We?, Wash. Post (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/deci
sion2012/we- have-to-fix-that-but-will-we/2012/11/08/c83b4976-29ca-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story.html.
96 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
97 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 151–57.
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VI. APPENDIX98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106
State Constitutions’ Conferral of the Right to Vote

Explicit Grant of the
Right to Vote
Alabama99

“shall have the right
to vote”

Alaska100

“Every citizen … may
vote”

Arizona101

Arkansas102

“any person may
vote”

California103

“may vote”

Colorado104

“shall be qualified to
vote”

Connecticut105

“shall be … an
elector”

Delaware106

“shall be entitled to
vote”

Florida107

“shall be an elector”

Elections Shall Be
“Free,” “Free and
Open,” or “Free
and Equal”

Implicit Grant of
the Right to Vote
Through Negative
Language

“All elections shall be
free and equal”

“No Person shall be
entitled to
vote … unless”;
“shall not be denied
or abridged”

“Elections shall be
free and equal”
“may not be conditioned by a property
qualification”
“free and open”
“No person shall be
denied … enjoyment
of his or her civil or
political rights”
“All elections shall be
free and equal”

98 This Appendix appeared initially in Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions,
67 Vand. L. Rev. 89, 144–49 (2014). It is reprinted here with permission.
99 Ala. Const. art. VIII, § 177.
100 Alaska Const. art. V, § 1.
101 Ariz. Const. art. II, § 21; id. art. VII, § 2.
102 Ark. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2.
103 Cal. Const. art. II, § 2; id. art. I, § 22.
104 Colo. Const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. II, § 5.
105 Conn. Const. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 20.
106 Del. Const. art. V, § 2; id. art. I, § 3.
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Explicit Grant of the
Right to Vote

Elections Shall Be
“Free,” “Free and
Open,” or “Free
and Equal”

37

Implicit Grant of
the Right to Vote
Through Negative
Language

Georgia108

“shall be entitled to
vote”

Hawaii109

“shall be qualified to
vote”

“No citizen shall be
disfranchised, or
deprived”

Idaho110

“is a qualified elector”

“No power … shall at
any time interfere
with … the right of
suffrage”

Illinois111

“shall have the right
to vote”

“All elections shall be
free and equal”

Indiana112

“may vote”

“All elections shall be
free and equal”

Iowa113

“shall be entitled to
vote”

Kansas114

“shall be deemed a
qualified elector”

Kentucky115

“shall be a voter”

Louisiana116

“shall have the right
to register and vote”

Maine117

“shall be an elector”

107

Fla. Const. art. VI, § 2.
Ga. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶ II.
109 Haw. Const. art. II, § 1; id. art. I, § 8.
110 Idaho Const. art. VI, § 2; id. art. I, §§ 19, 20.
111 Ill. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 3.
112 Ind. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
113 Iowa Const. art. II, § 1.
114 Kan. Const. art. V, § 1.
115 Ky. Const. §§ 6, 145.
116 La. Const. art. I, § 10(A).
117 Me. Const. art. II, § 1.
108

“All elections shall be
free and equal”
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Explicit Grant of the
Right to Vote

Elections Shall Be
“Free,” “Free and
Open,” or “Free
and Equal”

Maryland118

“and every citizen … ought to have
the right of suffrage”;
“shall be entitled to
vote”

“elections ought to be
free and frequent”

Massachusetts119

“have an equal right
to elect officers”

“All elections ought to
be free”

Michigan120

“shall be an elector
and qualified to
vote”

Minnesota121

“shall be entitled to
vote”

Mississippi122

“is declared to be a
qualified elector”

Missouri123

“are entitled to vote”

“free and open”

Montana124

“is a qualified elector”

“free and open”

Nebraska125

“shall … be an
elector”

“shall be free”

Nevada126

“shall be entitled to
vote”; also calls voting a “privilege”

118

“No member of this
state shall be
disfranchised”

Md. Const. Declaration Of Rights, art. I, § 7; Md. Const. art. I, § 1.
Mass. Const. pt. I, art. IX.
120 Mich. Const. art. II, § 1.
121 Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. I, § 2.
122 Miss. Const. art. XII, § 241.
123 Mo. Const. art. VIII, § 2; id. art. I § 25.
124 Mont. Const. art. IV, § 2; id. art. II, §§ 4, 13.
125 Neb. Const. art. I, § 22; art. VI, § 1.
126 Nev. Const. art. II, § 1.
119

Implicit Grant of
the Right to Vote
Through Negative
Language

“No person shall be
denied the equal
protection of the
laws”

“There shall be no
denial of the elective
franchise at any
election”

The Journal of the ACS Issue Briefs

39

Explicit Grant of the
Right to Vote

Elections Shall Be
“Free,” “Free and
Open,” or “Free
and Equal”

Implicit Grant of
the Right to Vote
Through Negative
Language

New
Hampshire127

“shall have an equal
right to vote”

“All elections are to
be free”

“The right to vote
shall not be denied
to any person
because of the nonpayment of any
tax.”

New Jersey128

“shall be entitled to
vote”

New Mexico129

“shall be qualified to
vote”

“All elections shall be
free and open”

“and no
power … shall at
anytime interfere to
prevent the free
exercise of the right
of suffrage”

New York130

“shall be entitled to
vote”

North
Carolina131

“shall be entitled to
vote”

North Dakota132

“shall be a qualified
elector”

Ohio133

“has the qualifications
of an elector”

“All elections shall be
free”

Oklahoma134

“are qualified
electors”

“the free exercise of
the right of suffrage”

Oregon135

“is entitled to vote”

“All elections shall be
free and equal”

127

N.H. Const. pt. I, art. XI.
N.J. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶ 3.
129 N.M. Const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. II, § 8.
130 N.Y. Const. art. II, § 1.
131 N.C. Const. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 10.
132 N.D. Const. art. II, § 1.
133 Ohio Const. art. V, § 1.
134 Okla. Const. art. III, § 1; id. art. II, § 4; id. art. I, § 6.
135 Or. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
128

“The State shall
never enact any law
restricting or abridging the right of
suffrage”

40

Advance

Explicit Grant of the
Right to Vote

Elections Shall Be
“Free,” “Free and
Open,” or “Free
and Equal”

Pennsylvania136

“shall be entitled to
vote”

“Elections shall be
free and equal”

Rhode Island137

“shall have the right
to vote”

South
Carolina138

“shall have an equal
right to elect officers”; “shall be an
elector”; “is entitled
to vote”

“free and open”

South Dakota139

“shall be entitled to
vote”

“free and equal” (two
different clauses)

Tennessee140

“shall be entitled to
vote … and there
shall be no other
qualification
attached to the right
of suffrage”

Texas141

“shall be deemed a
qualified voter”

Utah142

“shall be entitled to
vote in the election”

136

Pa. Const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. I, § 5.
R.I. Const. art. II, § 1.
138 S.C. Const. art. I, § 5; id. art. II, §§ 4, 5.
139 S.D. Const. art. VI, § 19; id. art. VII, § 1, 2.
140 Tenn. Const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. I, § 5.
141 Tex. Const. art. VI, § 2.
142 Utah Const. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; id. art. I, § 17.
137

Implicit Grant of
the Right to Vote
Through Negative
Language

“free and equal”

“right of suffrage … shall never
be denied to any
person”

“All elections shall be
free”

“The rights … to
vote … shall not be
denied or abridged”
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Explicit Grant of the
Right to Vote

Elections Shall Be
“Free,” “Free and
Open,” or “Free
and Equal”

Vermont143

“all voters … have a
right to elect officers”; “shall be entitled to all the
privileges of a voter”

“ought to be free and
without corruption”

Virginia144

“all men … have the
right of suffrage”

“all elections ought to
be free”

Washington145

“shall be entitled to
vote”

“free and equal”

West

Virginia146

“is a qualified elector”

Wyoming148

“shall be entitled to
vote”

143

Vt. Const. ch. I, art. VIII; id. ch. II, § 42.
Va. Const. art. I, § 6.
145 Wash. Const. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 19.
146 W. Va. Const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. III, § 11.
147 Wis. Const. art. III, § 1.
148 Wyo. Const. art. VI, §§ 1, 2; id. art. I, § 27.
144

Implicit Grant of
the Right to Vote
Through Negative
Language

“Nor shall any person be deprived by
law, of any right, or
privilege”

“shall be entitled to
vote”

Wisconsin147

41

“open, free, and
equal”

“The rights … to
vote … shall not be
denied or abridged”

